When files are encrypted in place, undelete tools see ciphertext—not your spreadsheets. Recuva can sometimes recover shadow copies or pre-encryption versions only if those bytes still exist unmodified and the OS has not reused the clusters.
Ransomware families differ: some copy-then-delete originals, some encrypt in place, some abuse hybrid approaches. The observable effect on disk is what matters for recovery planning, not the marketing name of the strain.
What Recuva might still help with
- Unencrypted shadow copies or restore points that were not wiped by the malware.
- Sidecar files the ransomware never touched—exports, PDF prints, or cache copies in another user profile.
- Partially overwritten originals if the attacker’s script crashed mid-run.
That makes offline backups, versioning, and cloud history the primary answers—not another pass of Deep Scan. If you are unsure whether encryption happened, check file headers in a hex editor or look for ransom notes and extension renames, then involve security before mass copying “recovered” files around the network.
Containment before recovery
Isolate affected hosts from the LAN, preserve firewall logs, and avoid logging in with domain admin credentials from a compromised workstation. Recovery tools do not replace incident response; they run after you know the active infection is contained.
Law enforcement and cyber-insurance carriers sometimes require preservation steps that conflict with quick undelete. When in doubt, freeze the disk and ask counsel before you TRIM-heavy SSDs with exploratory scans.
For expectations around encryption versus simple deletes, also read the FAQ. The workflow page stresses backups and versioning as the durable fix once the acute crisis ends.
Backups that actually survive ransomware
Immutable object storage, offline tape, and write-once backup targets exist because online sync folders are often encrypted alongside production. If your “backup” is just another directory on the same NAS share, assume it is in scope for the attacker.
What not to do (even when panicked)
- Do not pay threat actors on a whim—involve counsel and law enforcement per jurisdiction.
- Do not run random decryptors from untrusted forums alongside production credentials.
- Do not mass-email exfil samples; you may spread malware or leak PII.
Forensic preservation vs speed
Write blockers and forensic images sound slow until someone deletes the only evidence of lateral movement. If your charter is “get the factory line running,” still snapshot volatile memory and firewall logs when policy allows—undelete alone will not reconstruct attacker timelines.
Afterward: rebuild trust
Rotate credentials, invalidate sessions, and patch the entry vector before you restore data—otherwise you fund a sequel. Tabletop the scenario quarterly so Recuva is not your only rehearsed muscle.
This site does not provide legal, insurance, or payment advice; decisions belong to your security leadership and counsel. Recuva remains a filesystem tool—not a decryption oracle.